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60-3169

8 MAY 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William Tidwell

SUBJECT : U.S. Intelligence 1965-1970

1. Undertaking to forecast a position or state of being at a point of time in the future is a difficult task but a very healthy exercise and probably should be undertaken more frequently. As we have often found our people are so occupied with daily activities that they have no time to look forward, to think about the effect on the future of their present actions or to set long range goals toward which current efforts can be directed.

2. My initial reaction to your paper is that the outlook for the future is too good to be true. The optimism expressed is not balanced with an adequate measure of pessimism and the possible pitfalls are not clearly outlined. Favorable results will be achieved by 1970 if sound, long range plans are made now. I believe the paper should contain proper words of warning of the unfavorable conditions that may otherwise result.

3. More specifically I would like to suggest that:

a. A better definition be prepared of the objectives of the study. As it stands the question seems to be, "Will the intelligence organization enable the nation to make its policy decisions on the basis of accurate knowledge and analysis of problems affecting its security?" The question should be stated in more specific terms with clear limitations imposed.

b. The study be confined to the Agency rather than try to include the entire community. We simply do not have sufficient knowledge of the influencing factors affecting other agencies to make sound determinations. Perhaps each agency should prepare its own forecast and the results then blended into a single comprehensive report.


c. Some of the basic assumptions be reexamined for validity. For example, the assumption in para. III, a, relates attraction and retention of talented personnel to

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pay scales. In our study of the career service program we found that money was one of the least significant factors influencing people to engage in intelligence as a lifetime career. The assumption in para. III, c, that there will be a change in policy of the administration that will permit an increase in personnel strength is unwarranted. Economy in government will be with us for a long time and we are more apt to have to do our job with fewer people in 1970 than we have today.

d. A further review be made to determine other significant factors omitted from this study. One that comes readily to mind is the likelihood of a change in top management in the Agency before 1970. This could have the most profound effect on the Agency and the community as well. It could bring with it new concepts of management and operations that could change the picture radically during this decade. Another factor that should be considered is the preponderance of WWII veterans in senior positions today. By 1970 many of these will be gone and by 1980 most will have disappeared. Barring another world wide conflict the rising younger generations will not have the same background, motivation and perspective as their elders. What effect this will have is difficult to evaluate but it should be given serious thought.

4. In general the paper is a good beginning and its objectives should be pursued vigorously. I believe it could be greatly improved if it was limited to specific aspects of intelligence in which the current status was described, projected plans and programs analyzed, possible contingencies and alternate courses of action considered, and then conclusions drawn which would soundly support the forecast for the future. I will be glad to have members of my staff assist you in this effort in any way possible.


Wm B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

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